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THE PRINCIPLE OF DEONTIC REFLEXIVITY AND THE KANTIAN
AXIOM
SERGIO GALVAN
Introduction
Some principles of propositional deontic logic present aspects of particular
philosophical importance. Two of them are the subject of the present study.
The first is the principle of deontic reflexivity OA→ A (in short the deontic
axiom T, i.e. OT) according to which if something ought to be then it is. The
second one is the Kantian principle OA → ♦A (in short OP) according to
which ‘ought-to’ entails ‘can’. Despite their similarities, the two principles
are profoundly different both from the formal point of view and as regards
their truth value within plausible normative interpretations of deontic logic
systems.
In the first place, the principle of deontic reflexivity OT is a principle that
can be formulated in a language comprising deontic operators alone, while
the Kantian axiom OP can only be formulated in a mixed language com-
prising both deontic and alethic modalities — or alternatively in an alethic
language of deontic logic in which the deontic modalities are defined by the
alethic modalities and the constant of idealization.
However, the greatest difference between the two principles resides in the
fact that the OT principle does not appear as an axiomatic principle or theo-
rem in any plausible system of normative logic — to the extent that its non-
presence is viewed by some scholars as a specific feature of deontic systems
which delimits their domain with respect to alethic systems or others of dif-
ferent type — whereas the Kantian principle is contained in a large group of
mixed or alethic systems of deontic logic.
Firstly, the Kantian axiom is valid in any mixed system (normal or regular)
in which the principle of correlation between means and end OA ∧(A →
B) → OB holds. This feature, given the almost unquestionable plausibility
of the principle, vouches for the Kantian principle. Secondly, it is valid in all
the alethic systems of deontic logic — those endowed with a normal alethic
base — in which the axiom Q holds, i.e. the axiom declaring that the state
of perfection designated by the idealization constant is possible (♦Q). The
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plausibility of Q is therefore a further argument in favour of the validity of
the Kantian principle.
Conversely, the impossibility of the OT principle’s appearance either as an
axiom or as a theorem in a plausible system of normative logic is confirmed
by the fact that it is incompatible with Hume’s law. This can be demonstrated
in the usual formulation — where normative (deontic) propositions cannot
be derived from a set of descriptive (non modal alethic) propositions — with
regard to a large proportion of the most accredited systems of deontic logic.1
It is perhaps surprising that OT is incompatible with Hume’s law, which
is valid for a number of deontic systems, whereas the Kantian OP axiom
(within the context of alethic systems, of course) is not. However, the rea-
son is immediately apparent if one considers the formulation of Hume’s
law set out above. In it a reference is being made to a set of non-modal
descriptive propositions. What does this mean? It means that these are
non-deontic formulae; and, moreover, ones without modal operators. The
non-modality condition is essential because Hume’s law, in the formulation
given, no longer holds for a set constituted by modalized formulae. A vio-
lation in this sense would be the Kantian principle itself derivable in each of
the systems mentioned.
1 It is not possible here to give precise and exhaustive treatment of the results of non-
derivability (of deontic formulae from alethic formulae) concerning the formulation and proof
(within particular systems of normative logic) of specific but important exemplifications of
Hume’s law. However, as support to the arguments set out in the main text some of the most
significant of these results should be mentioned, given that they are closely connected with
the underivability of the OT principle under discussion. These results concern the impor-
tant set of pure deontic systems 0-KD, 0-KD4, 0-KD5, 0-KD45 and the alethic systems (of
deontic logic) KQ, K4Q, K5Q, K45Q, KT5Q. However close the equivalence relationship
between the systems in the former group and those in the latter — and between K45Q and
KT5Q — may be as regards their deontic parts, it is advisable to consider them separately.
First, by virtue of their structure, the alethic systems contain a series of bridge-principles (i.e.
principles which establish the relationship between modally different propositions) which
are of great importance as regards Hume’s law. Second, the group of alethic calculuses con-
tain the KT5Q system, which still today is regarded as the most powerful system of normal
deontic logic and for this reason deserving of particular attention. And yet the following
formulation of Hume’s law applies to all these systems (K in short). Let a consistent set M
of non-modal alethic formulae be given, and let the so-called condition of the logical non-
validity in K of the deontic proposition A hold (i.e. |+K A), then A is not derivable in K from
M either (i.e. M |+K A). The relevance of these results to my argument is obvious. From
them follows the underivability of OT in each of the systems mentioned. Suppose, in fact,
for the sake of argument, that the OT-scheme is derivable in some K. Then also O¬p → ¬p
would be derivable in K — since it is a particular instance of the principle — and therefore
also p→ Pp by contraposition. But this is impossible because of the underivability result for
K mentioned above: however much |+K Pp may hold, one nevertheless has p |−K Pp. More
details on this topic can be found in Galvan (1988). See also Schurz (1997).
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Does this mean that the Kantian OP principle finds itself in the same situa-
tion vis-à-vis Hume’s law as the OT principle? No it does not, because if the
set of descriptive propositions — from which one must establish whether or
not the normative propositions can be derived — also contains modal propo-
sitions, then Hume’s law assumes a different formulation suited to the new
situation generated by the presence of bridge-principles like the Kantian OP
axiom. There are several of these formulations, but common to them all is
the idea that possible candidates for breach of Hume’s law are not norma-
tive propositions but relevant normative propositions. For example, one can
consider only elementary obligations to be relevant normative propositions,
and the non-derivability of these is sufficient to state that Hume’s law, in its
essential nucleus, is still valid.2
In conclusion, despite their apparent similarity, the OT and OP principles
have very different formal statuses. Their formal diversity is, moreover, the
consequence of their differing truth-values in the context of plausible models
of normative language. I shall begin with analysis of the OT principle in two
different contexts: the context of the teleological explanation of so-called
anthropic coincidences, and that of the intentional explanation of human ac-
tion. I shall then pass to analysis of the Kantian OP principle, this too viewed
from a twofold standpoint, theoretical and practical.
1. OT and teleological explanation
The problem of teleological explanation has recently attracted renewed schol-
arly attention because of the impact of the anthropic principle — proposed
by a number of cosmologists in order to explain so-called anthropic coinci-
dences — not only on the narrow circle of cosmologists but also on wider
contemporary philosophical and cultural debate. From the point of view of
my present discussion, it is interesting to ask why the debate aroused by the
anthropic principle has revived the age-old problem of teleological explana-
tion. To answer the question it is necessary to reconstruct, albeit in outline
form, the terms of the debate.
2 More precisely, let us assume as valid the formulation of the law for the powerful mixed
system KT5-OKD-OO-O (K-O in short) equivalent to the alethic system (of deontic
logic) KT5Q. Let a set M of alethic formulae and the elementary obligation OA (i.e. where
A is a formula not containing deontic operators) be given. Let the conditions of logical non-
validity (i.e. |+K-O OA) and of non-necessitation (i.e. M |+KT5A) of the obligation OA
also be valid. Then the law states that the obligation in question is not derivable in K-O
even from formulae belonging to M (i.e. M |+K-O OA). Again see Galvan (1988) and Schurz
(1997).
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According to the most accredited cosmological theories, the existence of
the universe in its current form — including the appearance of intelligent
life on earth — depends on the occurrence of a series of highly specific and
improbable coincidences made possible by imperceptibly fine measures rel-
ative to the unfurling of the initial conditions of the universe and to the for-
mation of its fundamental physical constants. Even minimal alterations in
these magnitudes would have had such incalculable effects on the evolution
of the universe that the birth of intelligent life would have been prevented.
And yet the anthropic principle (at least in its strong version) has been ad-
vanced to explain the occurrence of those infinitesimally improbable events
that are anthropic coincidences. The principle thus states that the universe
must be such to allow, at a certain moment, the creation of observers within
it. To paraphrase Descartes «cogito ergo mundus talis est».3 Now, given this
formulation of the anthropic principle, it is entirely natural that discussion of
the principle should also involve the problem of teleological explanation. In
my view the principle is amenable to only two interpretations.
The first is that anthropic coincidences are only necessary conditions for
the birth of intelligent life, which amounts to saying that the evolution of
the cosmos in order for intelligent life to appear could not have occurred
without the initial conditions, the fundamental physical constants and the
interaction times that go by the name of anthropic coincidences; but this is
as far as it goes. However, if the interpretation of the anthropic principle is
restricted to these terms, one fails to understand what its explanatory capac-
ity can be, since the principle simply states that without the initial anthropic
coincidences life would not exist. But it does not provide any information as
to how these initial coincidences came about. The correct interpretation of
the principle must therefore be another, and precisely a genuine teleological
explanation.
My mention of a genuine notion of teleology when dealing with the an-
thropic principle is no coincidence. Philosophical reflection, in fact, has not
always been clear on the matter, for sometimes presented as teleological ex-
planations are particular forms of causal explanation. These are certainly
endowed with greater complexity but they are no different in their essential
structure from the usual causal explanations or those akin to them (usually
referred to as nomological explanations). It is therefore advisable to dwell
for a moment on the characteristics that, in my opinion, are distinctive of
teleological explanations in the strict sense. Moreover, the issue of the ex-
planatory significance of the anthropic principle has emblematic significance
in this respect.
3 Carter (1974), p. 291.
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Generally speaking, two main trends with regard to teleology can be iden-
tified within the contemporary philosophical scene. On one side there are
those who maintain that the teleological analysis of a specific event (i.e.
a fact like the heartbeat) has the principal purpose of describing the event
itself, but not of explaining it. The event in question, according to this inter-
pretation, can be described by saying that it serves some purpose, that it has
the function of doing something (in the example, making the blood circu-
late), whereas its presence — its happening — has a causal explanation like
any other event. The other interpretation instead maintains that the teleolog-
ical analysis of a specific event does not have a simple descriptive purpose,
for it is also intended to furnish a proper etiological explanation of the event
itself. According to this interpretation, therefore, teleological explanations
are real, not causal explanations of the happening or of the presence of the
event or fact considered, even if several positions can be taken regarding the
interpretation of this explanatory rather than causal role.
Belonging to the first group are authors such as Nagel or Hempel,4 who
maintain that teleological explanations can be reformulated in terms of stan-
dard nomological (in particular causal) ones. In synthesis: the fact that the
heart beats in order to make the blood circulate means (according to these
authors) that the beating of the heart in normal conditions is the necessary
condition for the blood to circulate. If, in addition to this, we take account
of the fact that in the given conditions the heartbeat is also the sufficient
condition for the blood to circulate, we may argue with Mackie5 that the
heartbeat is actually the cause of blood circulation. Hence, the teleological
explanation according to which “the purpose of the heartbeat is to circulate
the blood” is replaced by the causal (i.e. formulated in terms of antecedent
conditions and the mechanisms that produce the effect) explanation which
says that “the blood circulation is caused by the beat of the heart”.
Of course, the point of view related to such approaches does not gainsay
either the possibility of ascribing functions to objects or even the use of
teleological explanations. Nevertheless, this is allowed because the authors
who share this perspective assume that the attributions of functions can be
completely reformulated in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions and
that the use of teleological explanations is in the last analysis a question of
style and not of substance.
This point of view is rejected out of hand by the authors belonging to
the second group. In this respect, L. Wright assumes what can be taken to
4 Nagel (1961), (1968) and Hempel (1965). See also: Beckner (1968) and Braithwaite
(1953).
5 As we know, according to Mackie’s theory, the cause is an INUS condition. See Mackie
(1974).
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be a representative position. He provides the basis for an analysis of the
concept of function that acknowledges its non-dispensability in the use of
teleological explanations.6 According to Wright, saying that the function of
X (heartbeat) is Z (to make the blood circulate) means: (i) X (the heartbeat)
is there because it does Z (circulates the blood); (ii) Z (blood circulation) is
a consequence (or result) of X’s being there (heartbeat). One notes that the
peculiarity of Wright’s analysis resides in the first clause, which states that
the presence of X is etiologically explained by the function performed by X,
namely Z. However, problems arise when we try to interpret the nature of
this etiological explanatory relationship between Z and X.
First of all, it is rather implausible to interpret the teleological order ex-
pressed by the relationship between X and Z as a simple tendency. A ten-
dency, in fact, consists of a propensity to behave, given certain conditions,
in a pre-established manner; in other words, it is a particular type of statisti-
cal regularity. On this interpretation, therefore, the teleological explanation
coincides with some form of common nomological explanation.
Secondly, the teleological explanatory relationship should not be confused
with any form of retrocausation. The profound revolution in physics brought
about by quantum mechanics, and more recently by the physics of complex-
ity, has obliged numerous physicists to address the question of the subjective
or non-subjective nature of temporal direction. If the temporal relation is
defined in subjective terms as something that depends on the observer but is
not intrinsic to the nature of things, the normal form of causal connection
characterized by the relation of temporal priority is flanked by that of retro-
causation. This creates room for a new and more comprehensive notion of
causal explanation as performed not only a parte ante, but also a parte post.
Furthermore, if one starts from a broad conception of cause, retrocausation
is justifiable even regardless of the subjectivity or otherwise of the temporal
relation. If a cause is understood as any element whatever of the explanatory
antecedent of any nomological explanation, and if the explanatory law is not
formulated in terms of temporal priority — which is legitimate if the ex-
planatory scheme being used is not subject to the limits of Hempel’s model
— it is entirely reasonable to view a cause as something different from the
initial conditions, and taken to the extreme, as a state of affairs subsequent
to the event-effect. Indeed, some scholars are convinced that the possibility
of explanations a parte post legitimates teleological explanations. The argu-
ment usually adopted is as follows. Explaining a phenomenon in teleological
terms, it is said, means explaining it on the basis of the end towards which
that phenomenon is directed. But the end is subsequent to the phenomenon
6 Wright (1976), (1998).
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itself, so that explaining it on the basis of its end entails that temporal sub-
sequent events are causally able to influence antecedent ones. Consequently,
the teleological explanation is identical with, or at least presupposes, retro-
causation.
However, this analysis of the question is not entirely satisfactory. I do not
believe that the teleological explanation is identical with, or presupposes,
retrocausation. I do so for various reasons which cannot be thoroughly ex-
pounded here but can be summarised by saying that there are analyses of the
teleological explanation which neither presuppose nor identify themselves
with the retrocausation relationship.
Among these analyses, mention must necessarily be made of the evolu-
tionary interpretation. This latter, because it is a looking-back theory, does
not presuppose any retrocausation because it justifies the presence of X in or-
der to Z via the evolutionary history which has selected feature X precisely
because of the good consequences ensuing from function Z.7
Of greatest interest, nevertheless, is the interpretation of the teleological
explanatory relationship in terms of ought to be.8 To my mind, this is the
most historically rooted modality with which to understand the teleological
explanation, and for this reason the most authentic and, as explained above,
genuine one.
An authentically teleological explanation consists, in fact, in the explana-
tion of certain events in terms of ought-to-be. These events occur because
they ought to occur either as an intermediate stage with respect to a final
state or immediately as a final state. Whereas, according to the causality the-
sis, events occur because they are produced by other events — and it is then
the task of individual theories of cause to interpret the causal relationship
in some or other sense — according to the teleological thesis, events occur
because they ought to occur. Now, the ought-to-be of something — i.e. the
exigency of this something — is inherent to the situation before the event-
end occurs. Hence the teleological explanation — assuming that it works —
does not in the least presuppose that the previous situation exerts a causal
7 There is a large body of literature on the evolutionary interpretation of the notion of
function and analysis of the teleological explanation. See, for example, besides the works by
L. Wright, Millikan (1984), (1998), and Neander (1998).
8 M. Bedau puts forward a position similar to this one. In Bedau (1998), in fact, he
emphasises the importance of the valuational point of view in teleology, upholding the role
performed by values in both analysis of the concept of function and explication of the tele-
ological explanatory relationship. I would like to express my gratitude to the anonymous
referee for pointing out the works of this author, previously unknown to me.
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influence on the event-end. Of course, one must establish whether the exi-
gency of something is able to explain the occurrence of that something and
how this comes about, but the retrocausation relationship is not involved.
Before assessing the plausibility of teleological explanations in the gen-
uine sense just outlined, it is worth stressing that there is a profound dif-
ference between the two opposing notions — causal and teleological — of
explanation. This difference is most evident in the teleological interpretation
of the anthropic principle; the only interpretation, in my view, able to give
explanatory capacity to the principle. This point is crucial. It is not at all my
intention to assert that the anthropic principle (in its strong version) is epis-
temologically valid. I merely wish to point out that if one claims explanatory
capacity for it, then one must confer the status of teleological principle upon
it. When shortly below I show the implausibility of genuine teleological ex-
planations, rejection of the anthropic principle in its strong version will also
be deducible from my treatment. However, as we shall see, this does not do
away with the task of explaining the givenness of the anthropic conditions;
it only means that the explanation should be looked for in a direction other
than that indicated by the teleological explanation.
The genuine teleological nature of the anthropic principle has recently
been forcefully argued by J. Leslie,9 who explicitly draws on the neo-Platonic
tradition in order to assert that the best explanation for anthropic coinci-
dences lies in the assumption — in keeping with neo-Platonic theory —
of the so-called ethical creationist requirement (ECR). It is true that neo-
Platonic philosophy is favourable to the teleological explanation in its rig-
orous formulation. In fact, neo-Platonic theory — especially in the most
mature and intelligent version of it in Plotinus — has a conception of the
Good whereby the Ought-to-be has original explanatory force, in the sense
that it brings into Being that which is worthy of Being in that it is Good. The
neo-Platonic law of the efficacy of the Ought-to-be does not apply, though,
only in the sphere of the One, which imposes itself qua pure Ought-to-be,
but unfolds in the various forms of teleology that more and more weakly —
as one moves away from the One — characterize reality as a whole.10
That the core of the neo-Platonic conception has been taken up by Leslie
is manifested by the meaning of the ECR which he advances in explana-
tion. What does this principle consist of? I believe that the best analysis
is provided by a key passage in Quentin Smith’s detailed review of Leslie’s
two works,11 which states that Leslie’s idea of the ECR as the cause of the
9 Leslie (1989) and (1990).
10 The Enneads, Treatise 8, §18.
11 Smith (1994).
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universe is best formulated in the following logical, not causal terms: propo-
sition (1) “A universe endowed with intelligent life ought to exist” entails
the proposition (2) “A universe endowed with intelligent life exists”. This is
evidently an explicit argument of genuine teleological type, which, when ar-
ticulated into its intermediate steps and related to the actual world, becomes:
(1) the actual universe is a positive world because it contains forms of intel-
ligent life; (2) that which is positive ought to exist; (3) that which ought to
exist, exists; (4) therefore the actual universe exists. Moreover, (5) the ex-
istence of the actual world implies the occurrence of anthropic coincidences
during the initial instants of the universe; (6) hence it follows that the an-
thropic coincidences occurred in the initial instants of the universe.
In conclusion, the explanation of the anthropic coincidences offered by
the ECR principle is clearly teleological in nature. The coincidences are
entailed by the fact that the world with forms of intelligent life ought to exist.
However, it is precisely because of the clarity with which the explanation
of anthropic coincidences, in terms of ought-to-be, highlights the profound
nature of teleological explanations that it is easy to marshal criticisms against
it.
Why is a teleological explanation implausible? It is implausible because
a teleological explanation of event A explains A in terms of the positivity
of A (that is, it states that A is because OA, i.e. that the reason for the
existence of A is constituted by OA). And this is the same as saying that
OA → A is a logically valid principle (i.e. that A logically follows from
OA without the mediation of other principles). Now, as we saw in the first
section, the deontic reflexivity principle OT does not appear as either an
axiom or a theorem in any of the most accredited systems of deontic logic.
Indeed, in these systems the deontic modality of the ought-to-be is entirely
independent of the alethic modality of factual actuality.12
12 There is a substantial consonance between this analysis and that suggested by Bedau
(p. 275) for the teleological subject. Bedau cites as an example of the most demanding grade
of teleology (grade three teleology) a form of teleological scheme similar to the following
(where there are no temporal parameters, given that they are irrelevant to the logical argu-
ment): C is good; B is means (necessary) for C; therefore, B. Now, this argument is correct
only if the OT principle is valid. Therefore, the correctness of the argument suggested by
Bedau is attributable to the correctness of the OT principle in the same way as it is stated
in the main text that genuine teleological explanations are attributable to the use of the OT
principle. Nevertheless, I do not share Bedau’s conclusions. In fact, he (p. 283) argues:
“On the other hand, so grade three teleology in biology does not exist. There are no true
full-blooded teleological explanations in biology. Except for the teleology traceable to the
mind, the conditions required for grade three explanations are never present in the natural
biological world”. Yet, a little later (p. 286) when discussing a non mentalistic interpretation
of the Aristotelian teleology, he states: “Aristotle’s picture of non-mental biological teleol-
ogy happens not to fit the biological facts, but the picture is nevertheless possible. Full grade
three teleological explanations could be true in non-mental worlds. Thus, the grade three the-
ory does not collapse into mentalism, even if the two are accidentally co-extensive”. On the
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Of course, this is not to rule out that the reflexivity principle OA → A
holds, locally though not universally, for particular propositions A. It is im-
portant to realise, however, that in these cases, even assuming the relevance
of OA, the reason for A resides not in the simple fact that OA, but in a more
complex fact in determination of which the specific meaning of A is also of
relevance; that is, in a state of affairs in which OA plays a role only in the
context of specific hypotheses about A. In other words, it is true that we are
aware of the occurrence — often regular — of events to which we attribute
positivity — if not optimality — in the light of some shared axiological sys-
tem. However, the existence of these positive or optimal facts cannot be
explained on logical grounds — that is, on the basis of the mere fact that
they are optimal facts. Instead, assuming that a reason for these facts exists,
it should be looked for among reasons of non-logical kind. In short, there
are no logical reasons for the existence of certain optimal states of affairs;
their occurrence must be, in this case, explained in terms of other reasons.13
My arguments regarding the implausibility of the teleological hypotheses,
proposed in order to explain valuatively positive facts and the consequent
need to develop explanatory hypotheses of another kind, are borne out by the
tendency in contemporary debate on the anthropic principle to rely on expla-
nations for anthropic coincidences based on non logical-deontic arguments,
like those expressed by the ECR principle. Thus, analysis of the cosmolog-
ical debate on the anthropic principle is also useful as regards the search for
non-teleological explanations for the occurrence of anthropic coincidences.
There are essentially two non-teleological explanatory hypotheses in cir-
culation. The first, by far the most widely current in the scientific commu-
nity, is rigorously naturalistic, and it is significant from the epistemological
point of view because the positivity of the world endowed with intelligent
life plays no role in it. I refer to the so-called hypothesis of the plurality of
worlds. This hypothesis is supported (many specialists in the field report) by
contrary, I contend (and will defend my thesis) that this is impossible. Genuine teleological
explanations, which is to say those explanations that are not mentalistic of grade three, are
logically uncorrect and consequently non-valid. As we shall see later, only intentional ex-
planations are valid (they correspond to Bedau’s teleological mentalistic explanations). But
these have a logical structure which differs from that of genuine teleological explanations.
13 This is the reason why Bedau’s argument mentioned in the previous note, if analysed
in evolutionary terms, becomes conclusive. The argumentation was: C is good; B is a means
(necessary) for C; therefore B. Now, we obtain the conclusion from the two premises plus
the principle C is good implies C. But, if “C is good” is interpreted as “C is advantageous
for the fitness”, then it is tautological to obtain “C is good implies C” and therefore the
conclusiveness of the argumentation. Yet, in this case, it is not because C is a value that C
is given, but C is already given as a fact and it is only by accident that C happens also to be
good. This is enough to prevent the argument from being a genuine teleological explanation.
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the theoretical principles of quantum physics, and it states that the universe
in which we live is not the only one that exists. Besides our own universe
there are many others; indeed, alongside our own universe and physically in-
dependent of it, as well as from each other, are all physically possible worlds:
that is, those distinguished by initial conditions compatible with the laws of
physics at the moment of the Big Bang but nevertheless globally different.
The actual world in which we find ourselves, therefore, is only one of many
worlds — perhaps infinite in number — that exist but are physically inac-
cessible. It is thus not surprising that our world came into being and that,
for this purpose, anthropic coincidences occurred in the first instants of the
universe. Since every possible world came into being, it is entirely natural
that this is also the case of the positive world in which we live. However
improbable the occurrence of our world as a system isolated from the set of
other parallel worlds may seem, it is no longer improbable if we consider it
as one of the many possible actualised worlds.14
It is not my concern here to examine this hypothesis from the point of
view of its truth value. What interests me instead is the peculiarity of its
epistemological structure.
First of all, this is an explanatory hypothesis of the existence of our world
which hinges not on its positivity but on its necessity. Herein lies the most
important difference with respect to the teleological hypothesis based on the
neo-Platonic ECR principle. To be sure, it has a feature in common with the
latter, for it starts from the acknowledgement that the simple fact is not self-
explanatory, and that for this reason it is necessary to move from the typical
modality of the conditioned to some typical modality of the non-conditioned.
Those who invoke a causal explanation, like the one based on the plurality
of parallel worlds, nonetheless believe that this role cannot be performed
by the deontic modalities. Although the latter express a specific instance of
unconditionality — the ought-to-be can be constitutive and therefore nec-
essary — they are deemed inefficient with regards to the actual world and
independent of it. Efficacy is wholly transferred to the alethic modalities, so
14 It might be argued that the hypothesis of the parallel existence of all worlds is physically
implausible. In reality, as suggested by the anonymous referee, the hypothesis of the plurality
of the worlds could be interpreted as follows: “There was a (hidden) cosmic evolution of
the universes (inflations of vacuum fluctuations) — most of them dying out after a very
short time; several of them existing for a long time. In this way, not all but many many
of the physically possible universes have already come into existence. This will not make
the existence of our universe necessary, but much more probable (or less improbable) than
otherwise”. Nevertheless, I feel I should say that even under the interpretation of the existence
of our universe as more probable rather than necessary, the analysis of the hypothesis of a
plurality of worlds carried out here does not lose any of its value. Probability is nothing more
than depowered necessity or, which is the same thing, the necessity is nothing more than
maximal probability.
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that everything that is possible — including the world with its biosphere and
noosphere — necessarily urges towards being and, in the end, is.
The second difference is that explanation is wholly transferred to the alethic
modalities, in the sense that the positivity of the world does not play an ex-
planatory role, not even a mediated one. In other words, the explanatory
hypothesis of the plurality of worlds has nothing to do with a local exempli-
fication of the OT principle made possible by the fact that the antecedent of
the principle is part of a network of alethic relationships which mediate its
connection with the consequent. This is because the event to be explained
— the existence of the actual world — is a consequence of its pure being-
possible, in the definition of which its ought-to-be qua positive world plays
no part.
The second non-teleological explanation of the occurrence of the anthropic
coincidences consists, by contrast, in a reformulation of the so-called argu-
ment from design. Just as until the mid-nineteenth century (until Darwin
to be precise) it was claimed that the phenomenon of life could not be ex-
plained without the intervention of a Designer — or at least that without such
intervention life would be highly unlikely — so today it is claimed, by those
who embrace the argument, that only the hypothesis of a Designer can lend
likelihood to anthropic coincidences.
Evidently, this explanatory argument is profoundly different from the pre-
vious one. The essential difference lies in the fact that the key role in the
argument from design is played, not by the positivity of the actual world,
nor by its pure being-possible, but by the intention of the Designer. Once
again, of course, I am not so much interested in establishing the truth or oth-
erwise of this argument as in comparing its structure with those of the other
explanations discussed above. Nonetheless, this purpose obliges me to shed
some light on the nature of intentional explanations, given that the argument
from design hinges essentially on explanations of this type.
2. OT and intentional explanation
Put briefly, intentional explanations rest on the principle that the intention
of A produces ceteris paribus A (formally: IA → A, where I is an inten-
tional operator and the clause ceteris paribus is implied), so that explaining
A intentionally means viewing A as the product of an intention regarding A.
This principle is obviously akin to the OT principle in that it shares its re-
flexive form, and it is for this reason that I call it the principle of intentional
reflexivity and denote it with IT. However, since this is a practical princi-
ple, its validity depends on satisfaction of an important condition of general
relevance which must be verified case by case. Without such satisfaction
the principle is left suspended, so to speak, in its truth value. Simplifying
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somewhat and referring the interested reader to Galvan (1992) for technical
details, the meaning of this condition is broadly the following: in a prac-
tical setting, the intention to do something does not give rise to concrete
action until this intention becomes the intention which, ‘all things consid-
ered’, takes priority over rival intentions and is thus able to engender action
or, on a larger scale, fulfilment of the intentioned project. In other words, the
practical domain is characterized by a holistic context which differentiates
it from the theoretical one in which both the types of explanation discussed
above are located. Apart from this contextual difference, the IT principle is
isomorphic with OT. This is the reason for the widespread conviction that
explanation based on the argument from design is teleological in nature.
However, this conviction is mistaken, for it is an error to believe that the
intentional explanation is teleological in the rigorous sense with which the
term is used here. It is true — indeed obvious — that a crucial role in the
intentional explanation is played by the notion of end, given that the action
of the agent is explained in terms of the end that the agent sets out to accom-
plish. It is also true, that the notion of end is an evaluative one, in the sense
that an end is pursued according to its value. However, the relation between
the end and the action — that is, between the ought-to-be of the end induced
by its value and the action that seeks to accomplish it — is not an immediate
one. Instead, it is a relation mediated by the epistemic context of the agent’s
beliefs in which the ought-to-be of the end is inscribed. In other words, the
reason for fulfilment of the end does not lie analytically in its ought-to-be
— almost as if the end followed logically from the latter — but only in the
ought-to-be as intentioned by the agent. As a consequence, the cause of the
action is the intention of the subject and not the ought-to-be of the end, al-
though the latter constitutes the content of the intention. In short, the end is
pursued not because it is good but because it is believed to be good by the
acting subject.
Significant corroboration of the non-immediacy of the relationship be-
tween the ought-to-be of the end and its accomplishment is also provided
by analysis of the intentional operators. As we know, formally intentional
operators can be defined by means of specific epistemic operators applied
to deontic contexts, so that intentional contexts can be viewed as specific
deontic contexts in an epistemic framework.15 For example, once a suitable
preferential order (of a single subject) has been established and can be used
to define the deontic concept of optimality (with respect to the subject’s ex-
pectations), the proposition expressing the (subject’s) will to achieve A (for-
mally WA) can be defined as the (subject’s) belief that A in this particular
moment is for him the best (most sensible) thing to do (formally B(OtA)).
15 Galvan (1992).
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Also this formal analysis of intentional logic, therefore, shows that inten-
tional explanation does not coincide with teleological explanation.
In conclusion: intentional explanations are not teleological explanations.
This means that the former do not rest on the OT principle, which for that
matter is deontically invalid. However, intentional explanations are consis-
tent with the IT principle, which displays only structural identity with the
deontically invalid OT principle. This isomorphism derives from the fact
that intentional operators are definable as deontic operators embedded in the
scope of epistemic operators. It does not derive from the subsumption, by
virtue of the rule of epistemic necessitation, of the OT principle in a suitable
epistemic context. This confirms the practical relevance of IT but not of OT.
3. Analysis of the Kantian OP principle
The Kantian principle is plausible from two points of view. It is plausible
from the theoretical point of view of an ontology of the ought-to-be able
to give an acceptable meaning to the existential notion of sense, and it is
plausible from the practical point of view of a rational theory of action.
Why does the Kantian axiom have to do with analysis of the existential
concept of sense? First of all, in order to answer this question, it is necessary
to clarify the existential notion of sense, and to do so it is necessary to make
some preliminary points on the general notion of sense.
It is frequently asserted that the sense of an action (or of a project) lies in
the accordance of the action (or project) with values. There is certainly some
truth to this assertion. The action of an agent is sensate if it is performed with
a view to a fulfilling end. Likewise, a project is sensate if it corresponds to
the real requirements of the situation in which the project has been under-
taken. This general notion of sense can also be interpreted in subjectivist
terms. It is sufficient for sensateness, in this meaning, not to be conceived
as a relation between the action (or project) and the end (or the real require-
ments) inherent in the reality of things, but as a relation between the action
(or project) and the end (or the expectations) qua intentioned by the subject
and therefore deemed by the latter to be worth pursuing, even though it may
not be so.
However, there is a second notion of sense presupposed (antecedent), so
to speak, by (to) the notion just illustrated. Why should sense — in its first
acceptation — coincide with conformity to values? The reason, I believe, is
that it is good for values to be realised, and therefore the actions or projects
which represent even modally different forms of fulfilment of these values
are endowed with sense. It is sensate, therefore, that the positive should
come into being, although it is possible that this may not happen, as we saw
in the previous section. Yet if it is sensate that the positive should exist, it is
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a fortiori sensate that it should be possible for the positive to exist, i.e. that
the conditions for its realization should exist.
It is this second notion of sense that I wish to discuss, the existential one.
Here sense does not lie in the simple convenience that the positive should ex-
ist but in that it should be possible. This is presupposed by the former in the
same way as the possible is presupposed by the actual. Moreover, this notion
is existentially more important than the former one because, in this accep-
tation, it is not whatever conforms with the value — i.e. the state of affairs
that satisfies the value requirement — that is sensate but the existence of the
value itself. In other words, this second notion of sense allows us to deem
nonsensical a situation characterized by the inaccessibility of a certain value.
It does so for the simple reason that the value preserves its requirement of
fulfilment intact even in this situation, and yet the value cannot be fulfilled.
Nonsensical, for example, is the situation created by a legislator who legiti-
mately issues laws that cannot be obeyed, because the promulgation of these
laws entails the obligation of obeying them and yet this is impossible.
This second notion of sense was first defined by Kant in his practical phi-
losophy, specifically when he posited freedom as the necessary condition for
being responsible with regard to moral duty: you ought to because you can
choose. However, it is a notion with a meaning and a range that go beyond
Kant’s conception. In particular, it acquires the entirety of its existential
meaning within the context of an ontology of value which views it as rooted
in an exigency of being, and therefore as the reason for the fact that a state of
affairs is directed towards an end. In the light of this interpretation of value,
sensateness (or otherwise) concerns the existence itself of end-directedness.
If a situation is directed towards a certain end but is marked by the impos-
sibility of fulfilling this end, then it is a locus of non-sense in which an
exigency is set that cannot be satisfied. Conversely, a situation in which the
conditions exist whereby the limit present within it can be overcome is a
situation endowed with sense. Of course, this manner of conceiving the re-
lationship between being and ought-to-be presupposes an axiological option
based on a realistic ontology, thorough discussion of which is not possible
here. Suffice it to say, that the relationship can be analysed in the modern
terms of a supervenience relation where the axiological (and deontic) pred-
icates are implicated by corresponding ontic predicates (i.e. concerning the
dimension of being) so that they can be defined as ‘supervenient’ on the
latter. Now, given this analysis, the meaning of the assertion that a situa-
tion (or possible world) is capable of inducing an ought-to-be is obvious.
A situation induces an ought-to-be because the ontic predicates defining it
declare its limit with respect to the state of fulfilment that they require. In
other words, just as when certain characteristics are given a situation can
be judged positive as if the axiological quality of the positivity supervenes
on those characteristics, so one can say that the situation has an axiological
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quality of opposite sign when these characteristics are lacking, i.e. when the
situation is such to require them but at the same time has been determined
in such a way that it cannot possess them. Likewise it is evident why the
Kantian axiom is the law governing the institution of end-directed situations
satisfying the relative sense condition. These situations satisfy this condition
only if the ought-to-be that they induce can be realized — that is, only if the
end-directedness that they express is not endlessly thwarted.
I have said that the root of non-sense lies in an unachievable ought-to-be. I
have also said that this assertion does not concern solely the moral meaning
of the ought-to-be. All forms of ought-to-be are subject to the law of possi-
bility as the condition for their sense. Yet a particular form of ought-to-be is
whatever the agent deems to be the best course of action at a given moment;
in other words, whatever concretely and globally is first in the agent’s order
of preferences, so that it induces him to will and in consequence to act. The
Kantian axiom thus acquires specific relevance to a theory of will and action
that starts from the idea that the agent always wills whatever according to
his overall order of preferences appears at that moment to be optimal.
And this, in fact, is the most significant acceptation of the Kantian princi-
ple from the practical point of view. Given the interpretation of the ought-
to-be expressed by the principle in terms of a preferential optimality, the
principle can be defined — by appropriately inserting the deontic context ex-
pressed by the order of preferences into the epistemic context of the agent’s
beliefs — as the basic principle of practical rationality SP; the principle that
intention (will) entails the belief that the content intentioned (by the will) is
achievable — that is to say, possible. In fact, using Ot to denote the deon-
tic operator of the obligation defined as optimality, OP in the above sense
becomes:
OtA → ♦A
from which, by the rule of epistemic necessitation one has:
B(OtA)→ B(♦A)
and therefore, by definition of the intentional operator of will W (something
is willed when it is deemed optimal with respect to the order of preferences
at a particular moment), the basic principle of practical rationality or the
sense postulate SP is:
WA → B(♦A)
Just as the IT principle results from the transposition of OT from the de-
ontic level (where it is invalid) to the intentional level (where instead it is
valid), so the SP principle results from the corresponding transposition of
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the Kantian OP principle. There is, however, a substantial difference be-
tween the two principles. In fact, although the former is clearly analogous to
OT, it is novel with respect to it because it does not derive from the insertion
of OT in the epistemic context of the subject’s beliefs. This is owing to the
simple fact that OT is invalid. Conversely, the SP principle is some sort of
logical consequence of the Kantian principle, for it derives from it through
the straightforward application of the rule of epistemic necessitation, and
also acquires its truth value from it.
The interest of OP from the practical point of view is that it constitutes a
reason at once explanatory and justificatory for the fact that the SP postulate
of the sensateness of will is a cardinal principle of rational action. It is
difficult to deny, in fact, that human will — like any other form of intentional
activity — behaves in conformity with the sense postulate SP. Will is by
necessity always accompanied by the conviction that the object of will is
at least possible in the long term. If, then, one of the subject’s beliefs is
that OP, then the derivability of SP from OP explains why the set of the
subject’s intentions is grounded on the SP sense postulate. With respect to
the subject, finally, OP also figures as a clear justificatory reason for the
same postulate.
The cardinal principle of practical rationality mentioned in the previous
section is, of course, neutral with respect to the theory of good embraced by
the individual subject. What appears optimal to the subject may also be in
his exclusive interest: his happiness. However, it may be that the subject’s
order of preferences also comprises an objective axiological order — or at
least commitment to impartial principles like the principle of universaliz-
ability — such to constrain him to a behaviour not always dictated by the
personal exigency of happiness. It is also possible, however, that the sub-
ject may embrace a pluralistic theory of good which deems it inadmissible
to fulfil certain values and not others — in particular, fulfil moral duty to
the detriment of happiness — but requires the simultaneous and harmonious
fulfilment of them all, including the value of happiness as consequent on ful-
filment of the other values. Yet in cases such as these, where the subject’s
order of preferences is composed so that none of them predominates over
the others but all are taken into account, what will be the consequences of
commitment to the basic principle of practical rationality SP?
In my view, the principle states that one fundamental necessity of rational
will is to pursue globally sensate projects. Indeed, one may ask, what is a
globally sensate project if not a project perceived by the subject as not only
worth pursuing ideally by virtue of the values that it represents, but also
as one compatible with operational conditions and therefore susceptible to
fulfilment in respect of all the subject’s expectations, subjective ones as well?
In other words, a project is rationally willed only if it is deemed sensate,
and it is deemed sensate only if it corresponds to the subject’s expectations
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as a whole, which comprise, besides the intentioned values, also the belief
that these values can be fulfilled together with satisfaction of the paramount
exigency of happiness.
This contextualization of the Kantian principle has numerous implications
for analysis of the meaning of rational action and its presuppositions. If an at
least necessary condition for rational action is the principle that the project
pursued is to be deemed globally sensate — that is, able to fulfil all the
subject’s expectations — then it is not rational to pursue a project in which
moral values predominate over the exigency of happiness to the extent that
the subject must sacrifice his life — in favour of other subjects, for example
— in the name of these moral values. It is not rational because a project of
this kind is nonsensical and thus conceived cannot become the real object
of intention. It could be objected, perhaps, that such a radical opposition
between the two instances could never come about in reality, so that the
occasion to behave irrationally will never arise. Unfortunately, however,
experience shows that cases of this radical opposition do occur, and only
one of them suffices to pose the problem of principle.
In effect, the purpose of the Kantian postulates of practical reason is to
avert this problematic situation. The solution is achieved by requiring that
the absolute fulfilment of moral duty — i.e. the realization of a project in
which moral values predominate — is made sensate by the intervention of
God, who guarantees justice and therefore rewards personal merits in the life
hereafter. Of course, in Kantian theory the existence of God as guarantor of
the moral order and as overseer of the real order is simply postulated, which
highlights the cleavage in Kant’s thought between practical and theoretical
reason. Nevertheless, besides the necessary direction of the outcome — that
is to say, the shift to transcendence — the problematic root that generated
the whole of Kant’s argument seems undeniable. Rational will must, by
necessity, pursue the moral good only in the conviction that in the long run
the expectation of happiness will not be frustrated.
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore,
Largo Gemelli, 1
I-20123 Milano, Italy
E-mail: sergio.galvan@unicatt.it
REFERENCES
Allen, C., Bekoff, M. and Lauder, G. (eds.) (1998): Nature’s Purposes. Anal-
yses of Function and Design in Biology, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The MIT Press.
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEONTIC REFLEXIVITY AND THE KANTIAN AXIOM 19
Beckner, M. (1968): The Biological Way of Thought, Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Bedau, M. (1998): ‘Where’s the Good in Teleology?’, Allen, C., Bekoff, M.
and Lauder, G. (eds.) (1998): 261–291.
Braithwaite, R.B. (1953), Scientific Explanation, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Carter, B. (1974): ‘Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic Princi-
ple in Cosmology’, Longair, M.S. (ed.), Confrontation of Cosmological
Theories with Observation, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chellas, B.F. (1980): Modal Logic. An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Galvan, S. (1988): ‘Underivability Results in Mixed Systems of Monadic
Deontic Logic’, Logique et Analyse 121–122: 45–68.
Galvan, S. (1992): ‘Inferenza pratica e teoria del volere’, Galvan, S. (ed.),
Forme di razionalità pratica, Milan: Franco Angeli: 189–211.
Hempel, C.G. (1965): ‘The Logic of Functional Analysis’, Hempel, C.G.
(1965): Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: Free Press.
Leslie, J. (1989): Universes, London: Routledge.
Leslie, J. (1990) (ed.): Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company.
Mackie, J.L. (1974), The Cement of the Universe. A Study of Causation,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Millikan, R.G. (1984): Language, Thought, and Other Biological Cate-
gories, Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press.
Millikan, R.G. (1998): ‘In Defence of Proper Functions’, Allen, C., Bekoff,
M. and Lauder, G. (eds.) (1998): 295–312.
Nagel, E. (1961): The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World.
Nagel, E. (1998): ‘Teleology Revisited’, Allen, C., Bekoff, M. and Lauder,
G. (eds.) (1998): 197–240.
Neander, K. (1998): ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual An-
alyst’s Defence’, Allen, C., Bekoff, M. and Lauder, G. (eds.) (1998):
313–333.
Schurz, G. (1997): The Is-Ought Problem. An Investigation in Philosophical
Logic, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Smith, Q. (1994): ‘John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989), vii
+ 228 and John Leslie (ed.), Physical Cosmology and Philosophy (New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990), viii + 227’, Noûs 28: 262–269.
Wright, L. (1976), Teleological Explanation, Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Wright, L. (1998): ‘Functions’, Allen, C., Bekoff, M. and Lauder, G. (eds.)
(1998): 51–78.
